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Giving Meaning to "Meaningful Access"
in Medicaid Managed Care
Mary Crossley'
INTRODUCTION

Ct

J

GE

Experiment Aims to Save on Carefor Poorest, Sickest Patients"read

a headline on the Kaiser Health News website in December 2012.2
The "experiment" to which the headline referred was not the clinical trial of
an unproven drug on impoverished and illiterate patients in a developing
country, but instead was the State of California's compulsory enrollment of
nearly 240,000 people with disabilities and seniors into managed care plans
as part of its Medi-Cal program. The news story described how some MediCal enrollees subject to the mandatory enrollment were facing disruptions of
ongoing treatment relationships with their doctors and the resulting risks to
their health.4 California's purpose was to provide health care services for MediCal beneficiaries that were better coordinated and integrated, while reining in
ever-mounting Medi-Cal expenditures. The effort is aptly characterized as an
"experiment" because it remains far from certain how and whether these dual
goals are achievable.s And it is an experiment that other states will replicate in
the coming decade.
Questions about whether and how to shift Medicaid recipients with
disabilities out of the traditional fee-for-service setting and into managed
care plans are not new.6 Although Medicaid managed care enrollment overall
i Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. My thanks go to Leslie Pickering
Francis and Lu-in Wang for their insightful comments on a draft of this article and to Jessica Ton
for her valuable research assistance. This article grew from a presentation given at the Disability
Law Section's panel at the AALS Annual Meeting in January 2013.
2 Mary Agnes Carey & Sarah Varney, Huge ExperimentAims to Save on Carefor Poorest,Sickest Patients,KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/20I2/

december/o6/medicare-medicaid-managed-care-experiment.aspx.
3 BOBBIE WUNScH & KAREN LINKINS, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., A FIRST LOOK: MANDATORY ENROLLMENT OF MEDI-CAI'S SENIORS AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES INTO MAN-

AGED CARE 2 (2012), availableat http://www.chcf.org/-/media/MEDIA%2oLIBRARY%2oFiles/

PDF/F/PDFo2FirstLookMandatoryEnrollmentSPD.pdf. "Medi-Cal" is the name of California's Medicaid program. Id.
4 Carey & Varney, supranote 2.
5 Id.
6 See generally MARSHA REGENSTEIN & STEPHANIE

E. ANTHONY,

URBAN INST., EcON. &

RESEARCH INST., MEDICAID MANAGED CARE FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occaii.pdf
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has increased dramatically over the past two decades,7 the group of Medicaid
beneficiaries with the most complex and expensive health needs still receive
their care predominately in fee-for-service settings.' State governments and
policy analysts have long puzzled over how to shift populations characterized
by medically complex problems and significant non-medical support needs into
managed care settings in a way that both enhances (or at least maintains) their
health and controls program spending.' But, for the most part, states' forays
into this uncharted territory have been small in scale.'o
Several reasons explain states' tentative pace. Central among them are
states'concerns about their ability to contract with managed care organizations
that have the capacity to meet the medical needs of low-income people with
disabilities." These concerns,in turn, prompt questions about the legal adequacy
of the access and care that managed care plans will provide disabled Medicaid
enrollees.' 2
Despite these concerns, the movement of people with disabilities into
Medicaid managed care plans will likely accelerate over the next several years.
Even as cost-containment pressures continue to mount, in 2014 many states will
expand their Medicaid programs as part of health care reform, and more than
half the states hope to take advantage of new demonstration projects permitting
the integration of care and coverage for Medicaid recipients who also have
Medicare coverage.' Both these steps will likely entail making managed care
enrollment compulsory for more disabled Medicaid recipients. Given the high
stakes for this group, 14 careful advance planning for shifting disabled Medicaid
enrollees into managed care, close oversight, and appropriate responses to any
problems that arise as implementation proceeds are critically important.

7 See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE: KEY DATA, TRENDS, AND ISSUES I (2010) [hereinafter
MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE 2010], available at http://www.lindsayresnick.com/Resource

Links/KFF_Medicaid.pdf.
8 KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: KEY ISSUES TO CONSIDER
2 (2012) [hereinafter PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE], available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/20o 3 /oI/82
7 8.pdf

9 See, e.g., id. at ,.
10 Id. at 3 ("[M]anaged care has so far remained a relatively small phenomenon among Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities.").
ui Id.; see also discussion infra Part I.

12 See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Medicaid Managed Care and Disability DiscriminationIssues, 65
TENN. L. REV. 419,423 (1998) (examining "issues potentially raised under the ADA by states'decisions whether and how to include disabled Medicaid recipients in the massive shift towards Medicaid managed care"); cf Mary R. Anderlik &Wendy J. Willdnson, 7he Americans wiitb Disabilities
Act and Managed Care, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1163, 1164 (2000) (discussing the adequacy of access and
care of managed care under the ADA).
13 See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
14 See discussion infra Part I.
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As states plan further expansion of Medicaid managed care, this Article
examines the possibility that disability discrimination law might provide
a mechanism for prodding states in the planning stage (before people with
disabilities are compelled to enroll in managed care) to anticipate and plan
for likely access issues, as well as for challenging any systemic access problems
that arise as enrollment proceeds. Although the Supreme Court's 1985 decision
in Alexander v. Choate"s signaled a reluctance to use disability discrimination
law to police the decisions of state Medicaid policy makers,"6 Choate's holding
need not be an insurmountable barrier if compulsory enrollment in Medicaid
managed care has an adverse disparate impact on people with disabilities.
Today, state Medicaid officials typically are well aware of the access issues
posed by shifting their disabled enrollees into managed care and, in the case
of many disabled beneficiaries, are required to obtain approval from the federal
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) before compelling their
enrollment."
This Article argues that the process of obtaining CMS approval lays the
foundation for a disparate impact claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act"8
and Tide II of the Americans with Disabilities Act" (ADA). More specifically,
I will argue that access-related standards contained in states' applications to
proceed with mandatory managed care enrollment-if those standards are
not met-can support a claim that a state fails to provide disabled Medicaid
enrollees with "meaningful access" to the state's Medicaid benefits. Such a
claim should be cognizable, even under Choate.Thus, this Article provides a
conceptual roadmap for disability advocates for framing such a claim, while
also highlighting both the advantages of this approach and its potential
shortcomings.
To that end, this Article will proceed as follows. Part I will describe why
the stakes are particularly high for Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities who
are required to enroll in managed care and suggest that the greater potential
peril they face as a result of mandatory enrollment may give rise to a disparate
impact claim. Part II will explain briefly why the very concept of mandatory
managed care for Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities is unexpectedly
complex. In light of that complexity, Part III will describe the challenges that
Supreme Court precedent establishing a "meaningful access" standard for
disparate impact claims poses for disability advocates advancing a claim based
on mandatory managed care enrollment. Part III also will suggest an approach
to meeting those challenges through reliance on states' need to seek federal
approval for compelled enrollment of Medicaid beneficiaries with disabilities.
15 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).

16

See discussion infra Part III.B.

17 See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
8 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2oz2).
19 Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. 2, 104 Stat. 328 (codified at
U.S.C. §§ I2131-12165 (2012)).
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Part IV will explore briefly some of the possible advantages to the suggested
approach, as well as some of its weaknesses, followed by a conclusion.
I.

HIGH STAKES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

The Medicaid program is enormously important for people with disabilities.
Although many think of it as a health insurance program simply for poor people,
Medicaid is a key source of insurance coverage for people with disabilities.20
It fills important gaps for people whose disability (or employers' reaction to
their disability) prevents them from working to the extent needed to qualify
for employer-provided coverage, and its benefits extend to types of services
that-while important to people with disabilities-private insurance does
not typically fully cover.21 As a result, the Medicaid-covered population has
a higher prevalence of people with disabilities than does the population with
private health insurance. In Fiscal Year 2011 Medicaid covered approximately
10.7 million people with disabilities.22 This group represents only 15% of
Medicaid beneficiaries, but their spending accounts for 42% of Medicaid's
total.23 Meanwhile, expenditures for nonelderly people with disabilities have
grown more quickly than other segments of Medicaid costs.2 4
Because of Medicaid's importance to people with disabilities, proposed
changes to how the program provides and pays for medical and other services
are subjects of intense concern for those individuals and their advocates. And
because people with disabilities are such a significant driver of Medicaid costs,
it seems inevitable that the coming decade will see states continuing to push
to control those costs, most likely through initiatives to enroll larger numbers

20 See KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMmy FOUND., MEDICAID: A PRIMER I (2013) [hereinafter MEDICAID: A PRIMER 2013], available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2olo/o6/ 7334 -oS.pdf
21 KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND.,MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY AND ENROLLMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES UNDER THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: THE IMPACT OF CMS's MARCH 23, 2012 FINAL REGULATIONS 3 (2012)
[hereinafter MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY], available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2013 /or/8390.pdf.
22 ELICIAJ. HERZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33 202, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 14 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33202.pdf. The precise number of people with disabili-

ties who are enrolled in Medicaid is difficult to estimate. See infra Part II.A.
23 PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE, Supra note 8, at 2. This aggregate figure, however, fails to recognize that spending varies widely among disabled Medicaid
beneficiaries, from those who receive long-term care in nursing homes, to those who live in the
community and need less intensive services and supports. In Fiscal Year 2009, 6o% of the s5,840
average per person Medicaid spending for disabled persons was for acute care and 40% was for
long-term care. See MEDICAID: A PRIMER 2013, supra note 2o, at 27.

24 See Bruce C. Vladeck, Where the Action Really Is: Medicaid andthe Disabled,HEALTH AFF.,
Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 90, 90.
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of disabled recipients in managed care. 25 These efforts represent a natural
progression in Medicaid policy.
Over the past few decades, states have increasingly employed managed
care techniques in efforts to control and rationalize spending for the majority
of Medicaid enrollees comprising low-income children, their parents, and
pregnant women, 26 and to pursue the improved outcomes predicted to flow
from better access to and coordination of care. It is news to no one, however,
that state Medicaid programs face ongoing budgetary pressures.2 7 So the
multiple motivations, cutting costs while improving oversight and coordination
2
of care, and thus outcomes,"
that already have prompted states to enroll most
of their non-disabled Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care now increasingly
present an imperative to similarly shift disabled beneficiaries who have largely
remained in fee-for-service settings.2 1
Moving Medicaid recipients with disabilities into managed care, however,
is not as straightforward as simply enrolling them in the managed care plans
already serving Medicaid populations. Many of these plans are adapted to meet
the medical needs of existing Medicaid managed care enrollees, namely children,
their parents and caretakers, and pregnant women, and those needs-centered
around primary and preventive care-differ significantly from the varied and
complex needs of low-income people with disabilities. 30 Moreover, many plans
now serving Medicaid recipients are "Medicaid only" plans (meaning that they
do not participate in the commercial market for employer plans), and they may
rely heavily on safety-net providers like community health centers to provide
services to Medicaid recipients." Plans hired to manage the care of disabled
25 Cf John K. Iglehart, Desperately Seeking Savings: States Shift More Medicaid Enrollees to
ManagedCare, 30 HEALTH Apr. 1627, 1627, 1629 (20n) (describing the expansion of Medicaid managed care to the aged and disabled as "the most transformative change" states are pursuing in
Medicaid and finding no "realistic alternatives to the managed care juggernaut that is about to play
out nationwide").
26 See MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE 2010, supra note 7, at I.

J.

KAISER FAMILY
27 KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY
FOUND., MEDICAID AND ITS ROLE IN STATE/FEDERAL BUDGETS & HEALTH REFORM 4 (2013),

availableat http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2012/o5/8I39-o3.pdf
28 Achieving these goals has been elusive for American health policy makers. Cf Theodore
Marmor &Jonathan Oberlander, From HMOs toACOs: 7he Questfor the Holy Grailin U S. Health
Policy, 27 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1215, 1215 (2012) (describing Americans'unsuccessfiil "quest for the
'holy grail'-a reform that will decisively curtail spending while simultaneously improving quality
of care").
29 States'use of managed care for people with disabilities has already begun. While less than
20% of states'spending on disabled recipients is for managed care payments on their behalf a majority of states report that they mandate the managed care enrollment of some number of disabled
beneficiaries. See PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE, supra note 8, at 1-2.
30 See id at 2-3, 6-7.
31 See KATHLEEN GIFFORD ET AL., KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A PROFILE OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS IN
2010: FINDINGS FROM A 50-STATE SURVEY 18, 26 (2011) [hereinafter PROFILE OF MEDICAID MAN-
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Medicaid enrollees must be adapted to meet different needs, likely entailing
participation by more specialists and academic medical centers.32
Moreover, the fact that a significant proportion of disabled Medicaid
recipients also have Medicare coverage further complicates the challenge of
shifting those enrollees from fee-for-service settings into managed care. These
are part of a group referred to as "dual eligibles," which included 9.6 million
seniors and younger people with significant disabilities in 2010.11 Dual eligibles
are among the poorest, sickest, and most expensive beneficiaries covered by
either Medicaid or Medicare.3 4 Their coverage is fragmented between the two
public insurance programs, and as a result, decisions about their care are often
uncoordinated.35 While not all disabled Medicaid enrollees are dual eligibles
6
and not all dual eligibles are disabled, these two groups overlap significantly.1
Seeking to address this fragmentation and the resulting cost inefficiencies, a
provision of the Affordable Care Act authorizes a new office within CMS,
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, with authority to approve
demonstration projects entailing partnerships between state Medicaid programs
and CMS (which has sole responsibility for administering Medicare) designed
to integrate and align the care of and financing for dual eligibles.' The prospect
of these partnerships may both accelerate and influence how some states go
AGED CARE], available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/20I3/ol/8220.pdf
32 See MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE 20o0, supra note 7, at 3,4.
33 See KATHERINE YOUNG ET AL., KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID'S ROLE FOR DUAL ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES I
(203) [hereinafter MEDICAID's ROLE], available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2o3/o8/8 4 6-o 4 -medicaids-role-for-dual-eligible-beneficiaries.pdf.
34 Id. at 2.
35 For a description of how coverage and funding are fragmented for dual eligibles and how
that fragmentation can negatively affect both the care provided and the ability to control costs, see

generally Patricia Neuman et al., Dxfor a CarefulApproach to Moving Dual-EligibleBeneficiaries
into Managed Care Plans, 31 HEALTH AaF. u86, n86 (2012). See also Marsha R. Gold et al., There
Is Little Experience andLimited Data to Support Policy Making on IntegratedCarefor DualEligibles,
31 HEALTH AFF. 1176, 1176 (2012) ("Each [program] is structured around specific types of services,

and each includes its own administrative and service limitations and does not necessarily address

the composite needs for integrated coverage for people served by both programs."). One reason
for the lack of coordination is that, while Medicare is a purely federal health insurance program,
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that is administered at the state level. See id. While
state Medicaid programs are subject to numerous constraints in the federal Medicaid statute and
regulations, states also have a large degree of discretion to adapt their programs to the particular
needs of their state. Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs. (CMCS),
to State Medicaid Dir. (Mar. I8, 203), availableat http://medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-Guidance/
Downloads/SMD-i3-oO3-o2.pdf.
36 Sixty percent of non-elderly Medicaid enrollees with disabilities are not eligible for Medicare. MEDICAID's ROLE, supranote 33, at 437 4 2 U.S.C. § i3i5a(a)(i) (2012); see generally KASER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING THE STATE INTEGRATED CARE AND
FINANCIAL ALIGNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS FOR DUAL ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES (2012),
at http-//kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/201

3

/o/8368.pdf.

available
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about increasing their reliance on managed care to provide services for their
disabled Medicaid enrollees.
Even beyond these organizational complexities, the anticipated transition
to managed care is fraught with both promise and peril for disabled Medicaid
recipients. 'The very characteristics that make managed care organizations
appealing to state Medicaid planners-defined provider *networks,
comprehensive coverage of services, and capitated pricing-have also produced
conflicting expectations about how mandatory enrollment will affect access
to care for people with disabilities." On the one hand, managed care seeks
to improve the coordination of care and encourage the use of preventive
services, which in theory should improve satisfaction and outcomes for people
with disabilities and reduce the cost of care." Moreover, if managed care can
effectively integrate the preventive care, acute care, and long-term services and
supports (LTSS) that people with disabilities receive, they may be better able to
avoid institutionalization and remain in the community.
On the other hand, managed care's use of capitated payments (combined
with imperfect risk adjustment for people with disabilities) and utilization
management may lead to "cherry picking"40 and enrollee under-service. 41 In
addition, because most managed care plans have limited experience serving
people with disabilities, they may lack adequate networks of specialist providers
and be unprepared to serve enrollees whose medical needs are often interwoven
with needs for durable medical equipment, ancillary supports, and long-term
care. 42 As a result, even if a managed care plan's contract with the state requires
it to provide a full range of Medicaid-covered services, it may not have contracts
with a mix of providers capable of fully meeting disabled enrollees'needs.
The evidentiary basis for judging whether these concerns are justified is
scant, largely because relatively few disabled Medicaid recipients have been
compelled to enroll in managed care until recently.The limited research that has
been published contains mixed findings regarding managed care enrollment's
effect on access to care. 43 Despite the limited research to date, policy analysts and
38 Marguerite E. Burns, MedicaidManaged Care and Health CareAccessforAdult Beneficiaries
with Disabilities,44 HEALTH SERVICES RES. IS21, 1523 (2009).
39 See Deanna Okrent, Can It Succeed? States to Rollout MoreMedicaidManaged Care,HEALTH
PROGRESS 23 Nov.-Dec. 2012 available at http://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/health-pro
gress/426c77d5d7od442d8fe366b 9 2db82734-pdf
40 See Nina Bernstein, Advocates Say Managed-CarePlans Shun the Most DisabledMedicaid
Users, N.Y. TIMES, May I, 2083, at A2o (describing examples reported by advocates for the disabled

in New York).
41 See Burns, supra note 38, at 8523; Iglehart, supra note 25, at 1628 (noting that capitated arrangements provide "inherent incentives to underserve patients or deny them access to needed
care").
42 See PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE, supra note 8, at 2.
43 One literature review of the effects of managed care for children with special health care
needs found some evidence of increased access for those children when they were enrolled in a
Medicaid or State Children's Health Insurance Program managed care plan, as compared to the
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advocacy groups have explored and robustly discussed both the promise and the
peril associated with shifting people with disabilities into Medicaid managed
care." The resulting policy briefs and white papers catalog steps that Medicaid
planners can take to maximize the beneficial coordination and quality of care
for disabled enrollees while avoiding barriers to access. 45 For example, plans are
encouraged to recruit physicians and practices that are committed to serving
patients with both mental and physical limitations and to provide cultural
competency training for physicians and staff to enhance their understanding of
and sensitivity to the special needs of persons with disabilities."
While experts can identify likely pitfalls and suggest potential fixes, no one
can predict with certainty exactly what will happen once the transition occurs
on a large scale. Hence the "Huge Experiment" headline from California. 47
What seems certain, however, is that when it comes to mandatory enrollment
in Medicaid managed care, the stakes are higher for people with disabilities
than for the rest of the covered population. 48 If this "experiment" is a success,
traditional fee-for-service Medicaid program. Lynne C. Huffman et al., Impact ofManaged Care on
PubliclyInsured Children with SpecialHealth CareNeeds, so ACAD. PEDIATRICS 48, 48, 50, 53 (2010).
By contrast, a study of adults with disabilities found that, relative to fee-for-service enrollees, Medicaid recipients enrolled in managed care plans were 32% more likely to report a problem getting
to see a specialist and 1o.2% less likely to report having received a flu shot in the past year. Burns,
supra note 38, at 1531-32. For a summary of key research on Medicaid managed care and people
with disabilities see PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE, supra note 8,
at 16-17 app.
44 See, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF MANAGED CARE IN MEDICAID AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES 1-5 (2012) [hereinafter NCD ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS],

available
at http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia-repository/de64d45c_3ab8_48da- 9 fcc_12acca 3 9 8co?document.
pdf (indicating the important implications and adverse effects in regard to changes in the system);
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES:
POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

FOR STATE AND FEDERAL POLICYMAKERS I

(2013) [hereinafter NCD POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS], available at http://

www.ncd.gov/rawmedia-repository/20Ca8222-42d6_ 4a55
9 e85_6bd 57 7 88d 726?document.pdf (setting forth twenty-two principles to "guide the design and implementation of managed care for
people with disabilities"); see generally PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED
CARE, supra note 8 (recognizing both the pros and the cons of such a system); cf DEBRAJ. LIPSON
ET AL.,

AARP

PUB. POLICY INST., KEEPING WATCH: BUILDING STATE CAPACITY TO OVERSEE

MEDICAID MANAGED LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS 4 (2012), available at http://www.
aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public-policy-institute/health/keeping-watch-building-

state-capacity-to-oversee-medicaid-managed-ltss-AARP-ppi-health.pdf
insight into program implementation issues, as well as benefits).

(providing

further

45 See PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE, sUpra note 8, at 7.

46 See id.
47 See Carey & Varney, supra note 2 and accompanying text; Iglehart, supra note 25, at 1627
(calling the likely impact of Medicaid managed care on people with disabilities and the elderly "a

major unknown").
48 See PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE, supra note 8, at i (noting
that "both the potential risks and gains [of Medicaid managed care] may be greatest" for people
with disabilities).
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then disabled enrollees stand to reap great benefits in terms of the integration
and coordination of the varied types of services they need. But if it fails, their
greater medical and support needs make them especially vulnerable to suffering
from a lack of access and disruption in their care. In short, a real risk exists that
mandatory enrollment in Medicaid managed care could cause disproportionate
harm to disabled enrollees.
II.

COMPLEXITY IN FRAMING THE QUESTION

In light of this risk, this Article considers a basic question: Would § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA49 provide a remedy for Medicaid
recipients with disabilities if their mandatory enrollment in managed care
produced an adverse disparate impact on them?s0 As discussed below, advocates
for people with disabilities should have a strong argument that the answer to
this question is "yes." But, for several reasons, the very terms of the question are
surprisingly complex. In particular, two aspects of this complexity flow from
the intricate nature of Medicaid eligibility, coverage, and administration.s" First,
defining "Medicaid recipients with disabilities" as a distinct group is tricky.52
Second, understanding when and how states can compel disabled Medicaid
49 State Medicaid agencies are simultaneously recipients of federal financial assistance, which
subjects them to the coverage of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and public entities subject
to the terms of Tide II of the ADA. See Loye v. County of Dakota, 625 F3 d 49 4 ,496 (8th Cir. 2oo).
Although the "meaningful access" standard originated in Alexander v. Choate,a case decided under
§ 5 04 , it applies as well to claims brought under Title II. See id. (construing Title II to incorporate
the standard). Because the extent to which Title II abrogates state sovereign immunity remains a
contested question, however, disability advocates alleging a state Medicaid program's failure to provide meaningful access may choose to state claims under both statutes. See United States v. Georgia,
546 U.S. 151, 159 (20o6) (holding that Title II abrogates state sovereign immunity to the extent that
it permits private damages action against states for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth
Amendment); Betsy Ginsberg, Out with the New, In with the Old TheImportanceofSection504 ofthe
RehabilitationActtoPrisonerswith Disabilities,36FORDHAM URB. LJ. 713,729-35 (2009) (describing
the uncertainty regarding sovereign immunity and Title II); Ani B. Satz, FragmentedLives:Disability Discriminationand the Role of "EnvironmentFraming,"68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 187, 224 (SOn1)
("[T]he boundaries of [ADA Title II's] abrogation are unclear under the U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence."). In fact, Ginsberg suggests that in some instances disability advocates consider
bringing claims based on § 504 alone. See Ginsberg,supra, at 744-45. Because Congress's Spending
Clause authority is an independent basis for enacting § 504, states are generally held to waive their
Eleventh Amendment defense by their ongoing acceptance of federal funds. Id. at 734.
so See Elizabeth Pendo, Disability,Equipment Barriers,and Women's Health: Using the ADA to
Provide MeaningfulAccess, 2 ST. Louis U.J. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 15, 49-53 (2008) (noting disparate
treatment claims may also be available when managed care providers do not have fully accessible
offices or equipment).

si Cf Sara Rosenbaum et al., Olmstead v. L.C.: Implicationsfor Medicaidand Other Publicly
FundedHealth Services, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 93,124 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenbaum et al., Olmstead
v. L.C.] ("Medicaid is . .. one of the most complex pieces of social welfare legislation ever enacted."). Rosenbaum's article provides a concise and helpful description of the Medicaid program.
Id. at 124-31.
52 Id. at 126-27 (noting the different ways a state can define "disability").
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recipients to enroll in managed care requires at least a basic grasp of the types
of managed care that Medicaid programs employ and the waiver process that
states typically must use to compel this population's enrollment in managed
care. This Part briefly elucidates these complicating matters, before the Article
proceeds in Part IV to address the question head on.
A. Who Are "MedicaidRecipients with Disabilities"?
Historically, eligibility for Medicaid has been based on a person having a
low income and falling into a statutorily defined eligibility category." These
categories provide pathways to Medicaid eligibility, and while one of these
pathways is explicitly disability-focused, people with disabilities may become
eligible for Medicaid via other pathways as well.
The most disability-congruent category comprises nonelderly people
who are eligible for Medicaid because they qualify for Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) payments from the federal government by having a low income,
limited assets, and a significant disability that prevents them from engaging
in substantial gainful employment.5 4 This group is itself quite heterogeneous,
including, for example, people with developmental disabilities, people with
persistent mental illnesses, people living with AIDS, disabled children, and
physically disabled but cognitively intact adults."
Even Medicaid recipients who have achieved coverage via other pathways
may have conditions that qualify as disabilities, enabling them to assert rights
under § 504 and the ADA. In short, poor adults, children, and elderly people
may have impairments that significantly limit major life activities, even if not
sufficiently disabling to qualify for SSI payments.56 For example, a person
eligible for SSI because she is elderly and poor may also become disabled as
53 Though the number of eligibility categories has grown over time as Congress has expanded
Medicaid to cover more poor people, the core groups of low-income people eligible for Medicaid
coverage (expressed in the simplest terms) are children and their adult parents or caretakers, pregnant women, elderly people, and people with disabilities. See HERZ, supra note 22, at I. The broad
group thus excluded historically from Medicaid coverage are nondisabled, childless adults under
the age of 65. Id.
54 See MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY, supra note 21, at 4-5.
55 See Vladeck, supranote 24, at 91.

56 See MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY, supra note 21, at 5-6. Disability discrimination law's definition
of disability simply requires that an impairment substantially limit a major life activity (or that a
person have a history of or be regarded as having such an impairment). 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
The ADA Amendments Act in 2008 contained specific provisions rejecting a narrow judicial construction of the term "disability," which made clear that Congress intended a broad interpretation
of the term. See Elizabeth F. Emens, DisablingAttitudes: US. DisabilityLaw and theADAAmendments Act, 6o Am. J. Comp. L. 205, 2o6 (2012) (footnotes omitted) ("For nearly two decades, the
courts narrowed the scope of the ADA's mandate by, most obviously, interpreting 'disability' under
the ADA in a restrictive manner. In 2008, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA),
which attempts to restore a broader vision of the original ADA by, in particular, expanding the
statutory definition of disability.").
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she ages. Similarly, a child, pregnant woman, or adult caretaker of a child may
experience an impairment that, while it does not qualify her for SSI, places her
within the ambit of disability discrimination law's protection.
These individuals might be thought of as "incidentally"disabled with respect
to Medicaid eligibility. For them, disability is not the pathway to Medicaid
eligibility, but they are protected against disability discrimination. This group
will doubtless grow in size beginning in 2014, when states expand their
Medicaid programs pursuant to the Affordable Care Act to cover nonelderly
adults with incomes at or below 133% of the federal poverty level." 7These
beneficiaries are expected to include many previously ineligible single adults,
and many in this group are likely to have mental health conditions or other
serious medical needs, placing them within anti-discrimination law's definition
of an individual with a disability."
This distinction, between Medicaid recipients whose disability provides
their pathway to SSI, and thus Medicaid eligibility, and recipients who qualify
for Medicaid for other reasons but who also happen to have a disability, may
prove analytically important for considering a potential disability discrimination
remedy for ill effects that may flow from mandatory managed care enrollment.
Advocates should be aware that discussions in popular, policy, and academic
writing that refer to enrolling "disabled"Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care
most often use the term as shorthand for disabled SSI recipients-a subset of all
Medicaid recipients who are disabled for purposes of disability discrimination
law. In addition, these disabled SSI recipients are the group whose mandatory
enrollment in managed care has been fairly limited until recently, and whose
mandatory enrollment requires a waiver from CMS, as discussed below." In
short, most discussions of people with disabilities in Medicaid do not include
everyone who can claim the protections of disability discrimination law. But, as
will become clear below, disabled persons who obtain their Medicaid coverage
by virtue of receiving SSI may be best positioned to advance a disparate impact
claim.
B. CompellingEnrollment in Medicaid Managed Care
Just as the phrase "disabled Medicaid recipients" may signify multiple
meanings, a statement that states may compel those recipients to enroll in
managed care requires some unpacking. Both the "managed care" that state
Medicaid programs employ and states' ability to mandate enrollment in
managed care present multi-layered concepts.
57 See HERZ, supra note 22, at 2-3.

58 See Judith Solomon, Health Reform Expands Medicaid Coveragefor People with Disabilities,
CENTER ON BUDGET AND PoL'Y PRIORITIES I (July 29, 2010), http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-29zohealth.pdf ("A substantial number of the people who will gain Medicaid coverage under health
reform have disabilities or chronic health care conditions.").
59 See generally infra Part II.B.2 (discussing compelled enrollment in managed care).
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1. MedicaidManagedCare.-The label"managed care"may apply to a wide variety
of programs in which state Medicaid programs have enrolled beneficiaries over
the past two decades. Pursuant to federal law, states participating in Medicaid
must cover a wide range of benefits, and many states provide some, but not
all, of those benefits on a managed care basis.60 Most obviously, many states
have enrolled some of their Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care plans
that, like the managed care plans employers provide, cover a wide range of
primary and acute medical care and preventive services.6 ' A significant number
of states have also begun experimenting with providing long-term services and
supports (LTSS), such as nursing home care and in-home supportive services,
on a managed basis. 62 In addition, some states that contract with managed
care plans have created "carve-outs," in which discrete types of benefits (for
example, pharmacy services, dental services, or behavioral health services) are
carved out of the coverage that managed care plans provide.63 These carved
out services may be provided either through a separate limited benefit plan or
through fee-for-service providers.' Thus, wide variation exists in the types of
"care"that state Medicaid programs seek to manage, and this diversity will likely
persist as states apply managed care approaches to more disabled Medicaid
recipients. This Article focuses on states' enrollment of disabled recipients in
managed medical care plans, but its analysis is largely applicable to the state's
management of other benefits. 65

60 See HERZ, supra note 22, at 5-6 ("[F]ederal rules require states with Medicaid programs
to cover certain benefits under the traditional Medicaid program."); KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID MANAGED CARE:
KEY DATA,TRENDS, AND ISSUES I (2012), availableat http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.

com/2o3/or/8046-oz.pdf ("Two-thirds of Medicaid enrollees now receive most or all of their benefits in managed care .... ").
61 See MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE 20I0, supra note 7, at 2-3. Most of these Medicaid

managed care options involve risk-based contracting with a managed care organization (MCO),
where the state pays the MCO a fixed price for each beneficiary and the MCO assumes the risk
of providing all covered services. See id. at 2. Some states, however, have employed a form of managed care known as primary care case management (PCCM). See id. In PCCM, the program pays
a primary care provider a case management fee to manage and coordinate the care provided to
Medicaid beneficiaries, reimbursing the physician for services rendered that are beyond basic care
on a fee-for-service basis. See id.
62 See LIPSON ET AL., supra note 44, at 4, 6-7 (noting that in 202 "as many as 2o states [were]

expanding or plan[ning] to introduce risk-based managed care programs for Medicaid beneficiaries needing LTSS").

MANAGED CARE, Supra note 31, at 13, 23-24.
64 See generally EMBRY M. HOWELL ET AL.,URBAN INST., MEDICAID AND CHIP RIsK-BASED
MANAGED CARE IN 20 STATES 19-23 (2012), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2012/
63 See PROFILE OF MEDICAID

riskbasedmanagedcare/rpt.pdf (discussing the various ways that states carve out services).
65 The analysis would not apply, however, to states' management of LTSS. LTSS recipients,
who need assistance with activities of daily living, are by definition, disabled. If all participants in
a program have disabilities, the prograr's impact on disabled participants cannot compare to its
impact on non-disabled participants and thus, a disparate impact claim is unavailable.

2013- 20141 GIVING MEANING TO "MEANINGFUL ACCESS

267

2. Compelling Enrollment in Managed Care.-Although a number of states

permit disabled Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll voluntarily in managed care
plans designed for the general Medicaid population, states have been more
hesitant to require that disabled beneficiaries enroll in managed care.66 As a
matter of disability discrimination law, compelling people with disabilities
to enroll in a managed care plan raises concerns not applicable to optional
enrollment." Moreover, federal approval is often required for states to compel
disabled beneficiaries to enroll in managed care plans. 6 1''he federal Medicaid
statute sets out a number of requirements for state plans, including one that
allows Medicaid enrollees to enjoy freedom of choice with respect to medical
providers.6 9 As a result, states seeking to limit that freedom have historically
needed to obtain a waiver of the statutory requirement from CMS. 70
The types and purposes ofMedicaid waivers available to states have expanded
significantly over time, and a thorough description of waiver programs and
processes lies well beyond the scope of this Article. Several points regarding
waivers, however, are particularly relevant to this Article's analysis.
First, the trend over the past few decades has been for Congress to
grant states increasing latitude in tailoring their Medicaid programs to meet
their particular needs, and this trend has resulted in states' requesting and
implementing widely ranging waiver programs, with varying statutory bases
and purposes.71 The ensuing multiplicity of waiver programs makes it difficult
66 See SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., MANAGED CARE AND MEDI-CAL BENEFICIARIES WITH
DISABILITIES: ASSESSING CURRENT STATE PRACTICE IN A CHANGING FEDERAL POLICY ENVIRONMENT 3, 37 (2oo6), availableat http://www.calendow.org/uploadedFiles/managed-caremedical_beneficiaries.pdf. In 2oo6, the authors of a report commissioned by the California Endowment
"were struck by the very limited extent of state experience with compulsory managed care for
persons with disabilities, a fact that [they] attribute[d] to the complexity of implementing complex
systems of care for persons who experience both extensive medical and health care needs and very
low income."Id. at 3.
67 See Crossley,supra note 12, at 440 (noting that a state that makes managed care enrollment
optional for SSI recipients "appears to be in the strongest position legally ... [because it] allows
each individual to choose the program he or she deems most effective in providing for specific

health needs").
68 See generally CYNTHIA SHIRK, NATL HEALTH POLICY FORUM, THE BASICS: MEDICAID
AND SCHIP WAIVERS I, 4 (2oo8) [hereinafter SHIRK,THE BASICS], available at http://www.nhpf.
org/library/the-basics/Basics.MedicaidSCHIP.Waivers o7-30-08.pdf (discussing federal guidelines for Medicaid and SCHIP and program waivers).
69 See id. at 370 See id.
71 See id. at 2-4. The statutory provisions typically invoked by states seeking to enroll Medicaid recipients in managed care on a mandatory basis include the following:
* Section 19 15 (b) waivers, by which CMS waives the Medicaid statute's
"freedom of choice"and "statewideness" requirements for state programs.
42 U.S.C. § i3 96n(b) (2012).
* Section m155waivers, by which CMS permits states to pursue
demonstration projects experimenting with different approaches to
achieving Medicaid's purpose. 42 U.S.C. § 53i5(a), (e) (2012).
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to talk about "the" Medicaid program broadly, or even "the" Medicaid program
of a particular state.72 Waiver programs may focus on how a particular type
of covered service is provided or paid for, or may be limited to a particular
population or geographic area."
As part of this trend, Congress has made it easier for states to require
Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in managed care plans.74 Before 1997, if a
state wished to compel any beneficiaries' enrollment in managed care, it had
to obtain a waiver from CMS.7 5 In the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, however,
Congress facilitated states' pursuit of Medicaid managed care by dispensing
with the waiver requirement so long as the managed care plans used by the
state met certain standards relating to plan quality, solvency, and beneficiary
protections.76
Even with this easing, Congress retained limitations on compulsory
managed care enrollment for some Medicaid populations deemed particularly
vulnerable.7 7 Specifically, waivers were still required for the mandatory
enrollment of children with special needs and dual eligibles." These groups
overlap largely, if not entirely, with disabled Medicaid recipients.79 As a result,
states still have to seek CMS approval of a waiver in order to require many, but
not all, disabled Medicaid recipients to enroll in managed care plans."
* Section 1932 programs, by which states can amend their Medicaid plans
to require the enrollment of many beneficiaries in managed care without
having to obtain a waiver; this authority does not extend to enrollment
of children with special needs, dual eligibles, and Native Americans. 42
U.S.C. § 1396u-2(a)(I)-(2) (2012).
For a discussion of these statutory provisions, see Mark H. Gallant, MedicaidManaged Care: Statutory Standards,Provider Network Access and Coverage Obligations, and Hot Button ContractIssues,
As. HEALTH LAWYERS Assoc. 2-7, http://www.healthlawyers.org/events/programs/materials/
documents/mmso/gallant.pdf (last modified Mar. 16, 2010, 3:04 PM).
72 As of December 2013, the federal government's Medicaid web page lists 452 different current waiver programs. See MEDICAID.GOV, Waivers, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIPProgram-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/Waivers.htmI (last visited Jan. 6, 20r4) (filtering by
"current"). Many states have multiple waiver programs, many of which have nothing to do with
managed care. Id. For example, Nebraska has eight separate waiver programs. Id.
73 See generally id. (noting the various types of waiver program implemented by each state).
For example, Montana has a Children's Autism Waiver; NewJersey has a waiver to expand coverage
to childless adults; and Alabama has a waiver to provide home and community-based services to
persons with mental retardation. Id.
74 See generally SHIRK,THE BASIcs, supranote 68, at r-3 (discussing the various ways in which
states can compel enrollment).
75 See id. at 3.
76 See MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE 20I0, supra note 7, at 2.
77 See Iglehart,supra note 25, at 1628.
78 Id.
79 Waivers are also still required for the mandatory enrollment of Native Americans covered
by Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § i396u-2(a)(i) (2012). The category, "children with special needs," effectively includes most children with disabilities. Id. § i396u-2(a)(2).
So See id.
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Most recently, in the Affordable Care Act, Congress authorized new
demonstration projects entailing state partnerships with CMS to experiment
with coordinating and integrating Medicaid and Medicare funding and services
for dual eligibles." The goal is twofold: provide better care to beneficiaries and
increase savings to both Medicaid and Medicare. As of spring 2012, twentysix states had submitted proposals for demonstrations to CMS, and by spring
2013, CMS has entered into a Memoranda of Understanding with six states to
move forward with experimental programs.82 'Ihese programs will use managed
care for dual eligibles and thus, by extension, significant proportions of disabled
Medicaid beneficiaries in the participating states. 3
Ultimately, although Congress has repeatedly signaled its general support for
states'efforts to move Medicaid recipients into managed care, in most instances
when states seek to require the enrollment of disabled recipients, approval from
CMS is still needed to accomplish that objective." And, as described more
fully below, in order to maximize the likelihood of CMS approval, states'waiver
applications typically describe how they will ensure that disabled Medicaid
beneficiaries required to enroll in managed care will have adequate access to
covered services and providers.
III. USING THE WAIVER PROCESS

To

BREATHE LIFE

INTO A DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIM

A. The Challenge ofFramingthe DisabilityDiscriminationClaim

This need to apply to CMS for approval is key to this Article's thesis. In
essence, a state program that requires disabled Medicaid recipients to enroll in
managed care, but does not take the steps it has committed to through the CMS
approval process to ensure that recipients have access to services and providers,
may likely have an adverse disparate impact on people with disabilities. But,
successfully pursuing such a disparate impact discrimination claim will require
advocates to distinguish Alexander v. Choate, a Supreme Court decision rejecting
the availability of disparate impact claims against a state Medicaid program as
long as the state provides disabled recipients with "meaningful access" to its
Medicaid benefits." This Article argues that a state's undertakings regarding
access-ensuring measures, made in the context of obtaining a waiver, provide
a measure of "meaningful access" that should be enforceable via a disability
81 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
82 See Neuman et al., supra note 35, at i88.

83 Id. In its Financial Alignment Initiative, announced in 20u, CMS presented states with
two possible models for the demonstration projects. Id. One is a capitated model that will enroll
dual eligibles in managed care plans that contract to provide the full range of Medicaid and Medicare services. Id The other model envisions a managed fee-for-service approach. Id.
84 See SHIRK, THE BAsics, supranote 68, at z-4; supratext accompanying notes 70-71,75,7885 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,30,303,307-09 (1985).

270

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[ Vol. 102

discrimination claim. The next part of this Article describes and assesses the
"meaningful access" limitation articulated in Choate, before explaining more
fully how the argument might be used in a particular case.
To start, advocates should note that a disparate impact claim is probably the
only disability discrimination claim available to disabled Medicaid beneficiaries
who assert they are harmed by being required to enroll in managed care. 6 By
requiring them to enroll in managed care, states are increasingly treating people
with disabilities the same as their non-disabled Medicaid peers; thus, there is
no apparent basis for alleging different treatment. Similarly, to the extent that
non-disabled Medicaid beneficiaries experience access problems and other ill
effects from mandatory enrollment in managed care, any claim of a disparate
impact on people with disabilities dissipates. In other words, if experience
proves that mandating Medicaid managed care is equally disastrous for all
enrollees-disabled or not-then the policy (whatever its other failings) has
no discriminatory impact. Only when advocates can show that the state policy
compelling managed care enrollment has a greater adverse effect on people
with disabilities is a disparate impact claim potentially viable.
B. Alexander v. Choate
Articulating how a state Medicaid policy produces an actionable
discriminatory impact on people with disabilities presents a real challenge,
especially in light of Alexander v. Choate." In that case, disabled Medicaid
recipients sued Tennessee, alleging that the State's Medicaid plan disparately
affected people with disabilities, and thus violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, by limiting its coverage of inpatient hospital care to fourteen days per
year." Supporting their claim, plaintiffs presented statistical evidence that a
significantly higher percentage of disabled Medicaid beneficiaries needed more
than fourteen days of hospital care, as compared to non-disabled beneficiaries."

86 The caveat regarding the possibility of a disparate treatment claim-when managed care
providers do not have fully accessible offices or equipment--applies here as well. See Pendo, supra
note 50. In contrast to claims flowing from mandatory managed care enrollment, Medicaid changes
and cutbacks that threaten the ability of disabled beneficiaries to live outside of institutions have
prompted lawsuits based on Olmstead v. L. C ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). See, e.g., Pashby v.
Delia, 709 F-3d 307, 313 (4 th Cir. 2013) (upholding preliminary injunction to disabled Medicaid recipients who alleged that North Carolina's tightening of eligibility standards for Medicaid coverage
for in-home personal care services placed them at risk of institutionalization); M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697
F.3 d 706, 706 ( 9 th Cir. 2012) (granting preliminary injunction to disabled Medicaid beneficiaries
who alleged that a decrease in Washington's Medicaid coverage of in-home personal care services
would violate the ADA). Olmstead stands for the proposition that a state's unnecessary institutionalization of a person with a disability, who could effectively receive community-based treatment,
violates the ADA. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 582 (1999).
87 Choate, 469 U.S. 287.
88 Id. at 289-90.
89 Id. at 289.
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In considering this argument, the Supreme Court accepted the premise that
Congress did not intend to limit § 504 to addressing intentional discrimination,
but found "troubling" the contention that it should interpret the statute to
reach all actions disparately affecting people with disabilities. 0 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Marshall questioned whether Congress could have
intended § 504 to reach all instances of disparate impact, a conclusion he
reasoned would require all recipients of federal financial assistance to assess
the potential effect of every policy choice on disabled people." In light of these
broad implications, the Court emphasized the need for a balanced approach to
interpreting § 504's scope: "Any interpretation of § 504 must ... be responsive
to two powerful but countervailing considerations-the need to give effect
to the statutory objectives and the desire to keep § 504 within manageable

bounds."92
Thus, in the same breath, the Court rejected the idea that all showings of
disparate impact presented prima facie cases under § 504, but assumed that
the statute reached some actions producing an unjustifiable disparate impact
on people with disabilities." Turning to its decision in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis94 for guidance in determining which disparate impacts give
rise to cognizable § 504 claims, the Court concluded that § 504 does not
require a federal grantee to fundamentally alter a program in order to avoid
all differential effects on people with disabilities.9 s The statute, however, does
require a state (as a federal grantee) to provide people with disabilities with
"meaningful access" to whatever benefit the state offers through Medicaid, and
the state may sometimes have to make reasonable modifications to its programs
to assure meaningful access. 6
Applying this distinction to Tennessee's limitation, the Court reasoned that
the State had not deprived disabled Medicaid recipients of meaningful access
to the benefit at issue-fourteen days of inpatient coverage: "The reduction in
inpatient coverage will leave both handicapped and nonhandicapped Medicaid
users with identical and effective hospital services fully available for their use
.... "" It rejected any contention that the Medicaid program's benefit was
"adequate health care" and emphasized that federal law gives states substantial
discretion to determine what benefits their Medicaid program will cover.98
According to the Court, § 504 does not require a state to redefine the Medicaid
benefits it offers to assure that disabled Medicaid beneficiaries-despite their
90 Id. at 294-9891 Id. at 297-98.
92

Id at 299.

93 Id
94 Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
95 Choate, 469 U.S. at 299-300.
96 Id. at 301.
97 Id.at 302.
98 Id. at 302-03.

39 7

(1979).
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greater medical needs--achieve the same health outcomes as non-disabled
Medicaid beneficiaries." Because it found that the inpatient coverage benefit
under Tennessee's program was "equally accessible to both handicapped and
nonhandicapped persons," the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had not
stated a cognizable § 504 claim. 10o
C. Applying Choate To MandatoryMedicaidManaged Carefor
MedicaidRecipients with Disabilities
Even as Choateassumed that § 504 reaches some instances of discriminatory
impact, the Court employed a "meaningful access" standard to reject unanimously
a claim where plaintiffs presented evidence of disparate impact on disabled
Medicaid recipients."o" Choate's rejection of a disparate impact challenge to
Medicaid cost-cutting measures thus erects a significant barrier for disability
advocates seeking to use disability discrimination law to challenge other
cost-cutting measures, like the mandatory enrollment of disabled Medicaid
recipients in managed care plans.102
Professors Leslie Francis and Anita Silvers, however, assert that the
potential avenues for overcoming or avoiding this barrier have been insufficiently
explored and that advocates should build on Choate's recognition that § 504
extends to some state program actions that discriminate in their impact.103 One
way of limiting Choate's precedential clout is to read it as a fact-specific ruling
in a case where plaintiffs had failed to provide strong evidence of patients with
disabilities who had actually suffered harm as a result of Tennessee's limit on
inpatient coverage.'" Under this reading, a lawsuit where disabled plaintiffs
muster stronger evidence of differential harm might succeed in proving they
have been deprived of meaningful access to a specific benefit like inpatient
coverage.

99 Id. at 302-04.
Too Id. at 309.
101 Id. at 302 ("The i4-day limitation will not deny respondents meaningful access to Tennessee Medicaid services or exclude them from those services.").
102 See Crossley, supra note 12, at 440-4x (concluding that the decision "saps much of the
strength from 'disparate impact' arguments raised against the mandatory enrollment of disabled
Medicaid recipients in a mainstream managed care program").
103 Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, DebilitatingAlexander v. Choate: 'Meaningful
Access" to Health Carefor People with Disabilities,35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 453 (2oo8) ("Choate
leaves open a space in which 'meaningful access' can be defined. Crystallizing a strategy for defining this space is, we argue here, the critical step for plaintiffs to undertake in seeking to debilitate
the effects of Choate.").
104 See id. at 452 (suggesting that none of the evidence presented by plaintiffs at trial to show
discriminatory impact "was particularly convincing as to whether the facially-neutral fourteen-day
limit excluded people with disabilities from a meaningful benefit.").
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In addition, Choate explained that grantees may sometimes be required to
make "reasonable modifications" to their program to meet § 504's requirement
that grantees offederal funds provide people with disabilities "meaningful access"
to the benefits the grantee offers.' 0 Choate stated clearly what "meaningful
access" did not require in that case. "Meaningful access" did not require the state
to fundamentally alter its program by offering a benefit designed to equalize
outcomes for disabled and nondisabled Medicaid recipients or by providing
additional benefits to meet disabled recipients' greater medical needs. 0 6 So
what does the "meaningful access" obligation require a state to do as it develops
a cost-cutting strategy for its Medicaid program?
More specifically, what concrete meaning does this distinction between
required "meaningful access" and nonobligatory "fundamental alterations"
have when the benefit a state Medicaid program offers is not a specific item
of coverage (such as payment for a specified length of hospital stay, for services
provided by certain providers, or for a specific procedure or drug), but instead
is enrollment in a managed care plan, which in turn contracts with the state
to provide beneficiaries a broad range of benefits? What does it mean to
provide disabled Medicaid recipients with "meaningful access" to the benefit of
enrollment in a managed care plan? Interpreting a wide range of cases that have
explained "meaningful access," Professors Francis and Silvers argue that Choate's
"meaningful access" standard poses the following question: Does the state offer
a benefit in such a manner that people with disabilities do not have an equal
opportunity to use or enjoy it, as compared to other recipients?'07 Reframing
this question to apply to mandatory enrollment in Medicaid managed care, we
can ask: What would keep disabled Medicaid recipients'"access"to enrollment
in a managed care plan from being "meaningful"?
Reviewing analyses of mandatory Medicaid managed care for people
with disabilities suggests several ways that their access to Medicaid-provided
health care via enrollment in a managed care plan might turn out not to be
meaningfil.' First, disabled Medicaid recipients might be unable to use
standard enrollment processes for the managed care plans that contract with
the state Medicaid agency.o' Recipients with vision, hearing, and intellectual
impairments would not have meaningful access if a plan fails to provide auxiliary
aids or other supports disabled persons need to use enrollment information and
105 Choate, 469 U.S. at 305 & n.21 (citing to regulations).
106 Id. at 302-06.

107 Francis & Silvers, supra note 103, at 453, 477; see also Alexander Abbe, "MeaningfulAccess"
to Health Care and the Remedies Available to MedicaidManagedCare Recipients Under theADA and
RehabilitationAct, r47 U. PA. L. REv. II6I, II84-85 (199); Laurence Paradis, Title H ofthe Americans
with DisabilitiesAct and Section S04 ofthe RehabilitationAct: Making Programs,Services, andActivitiesAccessible to All, 14 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 389,399 (2003).
1o8 See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE CURRENT STATE OF HEALTH CARE
FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES III (2009), available at http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia
repository/od 7 c84 8f3d97- 4 3b3bea- 3 6eid9 7 f9 73 d?document.pdf
109 See id. at III, 321.
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materials."10 Even under Choate, if the benefit a state provides its Medicaid
recipients is enrollment in a managed care plan, the very least a state must do in
order to avoid a disability discrimination claim is to ensure that readily available
auxiliary aids and other supports give disabled recipients an equal opportunity
to use plan enrollment processes." 1'
Second, disabled recipients may face access barriers when they seek care
from physicians" 2 who are in the limited network of providers available
to them through their managed care plan. Providers' offices and equipment
may be physically inaccessible to people with certain disabilities (e.g.,
mobility impairments or morbid obesity), or the providers may not be able to
communicate effectively with deaf or hearing-impaired patients." 3 Professor
Elizabeth Pendo's work explores both the persistent physical accessibility
problems in medical providers' offices and a possible remedy under the ADA
for those problems, 114 and recent research documents remaining barriers to
accessibility for some patients with disabilities."s If a state requires disabled
Medicaid recipients to enroll in a managed care plan, but the practices of the
doctors who contract with that plan to provide services are inaccessible, the
no See id. As a practical matter, if a state mandates enrollment in managed care for disabled
Medicaid recipients, it may seem implausible that the state would not make the enrollment process
as easy as possible for those recipients. If, however, the state leaves it to the contracting plans to
handle enrollment of recipients, those plans may not have an incentive to ease the enrollment of
disabled recipients who are likely to be expensive to cover. See id. at lo4-o6.
un Cf Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding, in class action
brought by prisoners, "[d]ue to the absence of interpretive services and/or assistive devices at parole
and grievance hearings, class members do not receive an opportunity to benefit from the grievance
process and the parole program that is equal to that of non-disabled inmates"); United States v. Bd.
of Trustees for Univ. of Ala., 908 E2d 740, 748 (uith Cir. 1990) (distinguishing Choate in case involving university and finding that "in some instances the lack of an auxiliary aid effectively denies a
handicapped student equal access to his or her opportunity to learn").
n2 The reference here to "physicians" is shorthand for the broad group of providers on whom
persons with disabilities rely for their medical and other needs, e.g., physical therapists, audiologists,
providers of durable medical equipment, to name just several.
13 See PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE, supra note 8, at 7 (noting concerns regarding physical and communicational accessibility).
114 See generally Elizabeth Pendo, Disability,Equipment Barriers,and Women's Health: Using
the ADA to Provide MeaningfulAccess, 2 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POI'Y 15(2008). The Affordable Care Act includes a provision calling for the development of access standards for medical
diagnostic equipment such as examination tables and chairs, scales, and x-ray and mammography
machines. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 4203, 29 U.S.C. § 7 9 4(f) (20Iz). In February 2oi2 the Access Board proposed a set of access standards, but as of this writing, the standards
have not been finally adopted. See Board Releases ProposedStandardsfor Medical DiagnosticEquipment, U.S. ACCESS BOARD (Feb. 9, 202), httpJ/www.access-board.gov/news/i63-board-releasesproposed-standards-for-medical-diagnostic-equipment.
115 See Tara Lagu et al., Access to Subspecialty Carefor Patients with Mobility Impairments, 158
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 441 (2013) (finding that many could not treat a patient who uses a wheelchair because they could not transfer the patient to an examination table); see also Pauline W Chen,
Disability and Discriminationat the Doctor's Office, N.Y. TIMES WELL BLOG (May 23, 2013), http://
well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/o5/23/disability-and--discrimination-at-the-doctors-office.
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state would seem not to have provided the disabled recipient with "meaningful
access"to the benefit of coverage by a managed care plan.1 16 If the "meaningful"
modifier means anything, it must require something more than the bare access
of being enrolled in a plan.
Third, medical and other services that a Medicaid managed care plan
officially covers may not be accessible to disabled recipients if the plan's network
does not include specialist physicians or other providers capable of providing
those services."' In other words, a plan's contractual obligation to provide the
specialized medical services needed by a Medicaid recipient with HIV and
tuberculosis, or the supportive services needed by an elderly stroke survivor
with early stage Alzheimer's, does not guarantee that those persons will actually
be able to receive those services. As a practical matter, meaningful access to
the relevant benefit-the services a state Medicaid program covers through
managed care contracts-will depend on the availability of enough providers,
with the needed expertise, within a reasonable geographic proximity to disabled
Medicaid recipients.
If disabled Medicaid recipients challenge this third type of inaccessibility,
Choate may present a real problem. Although advocates for people with
disabilities can argue that, without enough specialized providers, disabled
Medicaid enrollees do not have "meaningful access" to Medicaid-covered
services, Choate suggests a ready counter-argument.'Ihe state can characterize
the disabled enrollees as complaining that they do not benefit as much from
managed care enrollment as do non-disabled enrollees."' Thus, the state could
analogize the mandatory managed care complaint to the plaintiffs' claim in
Choate: Enrollment in a managed care organization with a limited network
disparately impacts people with disabilities (who tend to have complex medical
needs) in the same way that a fourteen-day limitation on hospital inpatient
coverage disparately impacts people with disabilities (who tend to need longer
hospital stays).' Because the Supreme Court held that the latter argument
n16 Cf Anderson v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, I F. Supp. 2d 456, 463-65 (E.D. Pa. 1998). When a
doctor's office is inaccessible, a patient with a disability (whether a Medicaid recipient or not) may
also have a claim against the doctor under Title III of the ADA, which applies to public accommodations. See NATL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note lo8, at 1o0-o3 (discussing lawsuits and
settlement agreements addressing physical, equipment, and communications access barriers). The
availability of an action directly against the provider, however, should not excuse the state from its
obligation to provide disabled Medicaid recipients with an opportunity to benefit from enrollment
in a managed care plan equal to the benefit enjoyed by non-disabled Medicaid recipients.
117 See Vanmala S. Hiranandani, DisablingHealth Care?MedicaidManaged Care and People
with Disabilitiesin America, 3 POVERTY & PUB. PoL'Y, no. 2, art. 7, 2o1, at I, to (stating that most
respondents in a qualitative research study reported that Medicaid managed care programs "often
provide inadequate access to specialists who are qualified to diagnose and treat special health conditions"). This may be a particular concern for disabled dual eligibles required to enroll in a managed care plan that is supposed to provide the full range of services covered by both Medicare and
Medicaid. See Neuman et al., supra note 35, at ni89.
u8 See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,303-04 (1985).
u9 Id.
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failed to state a cognizable claim under § 504, the former argument about
Medicaid managed care is potentially vulnerable.' 20
This argument highlights the indeterminate nature of the standard the
Court set out in Choate. Professor Sam Bagenstos captures this indeterminacy
well in discussing the "access/content" distinction that courts have employed
when deciding disability discrimination claims.' 2 ' According to Bagenstos, a
court that finds that disabled program participants are simply seeking access to
the same benefit that non-disabled participants already receive will find that
plaintiffs have stated a claim.122 By contrast, a court that concludes that disabled
plaintiffs are trying to force a program to change the content of its benefits
package will likely reject the claim as seeking a "fundamental alteration" not
required by Choate.12 3 Of course, as Bagenstos highlights, the level of generality
at which the relevant benefit is described will likely determine where a claim
falls on the access/content divide. 12 4
Despite its inherent indeterminacy, the access/content distinction suggests
how the parties might frame their arguments in a lawsuit alleging that
mandatory Medicaid managed care enrollment discriminatorily affects people
with disabilities. The disabled plaintiffs would argue that they simply seek
access to a benefit (i.e., enrollment in a plan providing the services covered by
the state Medicaid program) that non-disabled Medicaid recipients already
enjoy. By contrast, the state would argue that the lawsuit seeks to force it to
fundamentally alter the content of its program by contracting with managed
care plans with unusually extensive provider networks to meet the plaintiffs'
greater medical needs. A court could plausibly accept either argument.125

120 Id.at 289. But cf Francis & Silvers, supra note 103, at 451-53 (suggesting that ADA's broader purpose-compared to the Rehabilitation Act-might support an outcome different from Choate's). In addition, as Professor Francis suggested to me, this defense breaks down if-as a result
of a plan's lack of specialists needed to perform a covered service-people with disabilities cannot
receive the covered service at all. See id. In that case, the better analogy under Choate would be the
lack of meaningful access to a surgery that required a s5-day hospital stay.
121 See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOs, LAW & THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 70-74 (2009).

122 Id.

123 Id Professor Rosenbaum makes a similar point, using slightly different language. See
Rosenbaum et al., Olmsteadv. L.C., supra note 5i, at 133 ("Once a court determines that what plaintiffs seek is a restructuring of the design of an insurance program, whether public or private, the
fundamental alteration defense appears to be available.").
124 BAGENSTOS, supra note 121, at 72-74. Choate illustrates the level of generality point. The
Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that Medicaid enrollment entitled them to "adequate health
care," a claim that described the relevant benefit at a very high level of generality. 469 U.S. at 303.
Instead, the Court described the relevant benefit more specifically, as "a particular package of health
care services, such as 14 days of inpatient coverage." Id.
125 If the plaintiffs present evidence that a lack of specialists keeps them from receiving the
types of services that non-disabled Medicaid enrollees receive, then a court's acceptance of the
state's argument is less plausible. Even in that case, however, the state is likely to characterize the
covered benefit with a high level of specificity to show that plaintiffs have access to it.
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If, however, disabled plaintiffs can argue that disability discrimination
law entitles them to a benefit with specific features the state itselfhas already
agreed are needed to assure access for disabled Medicaid beneficiaries, the
state's "fundamental alteration" argument loses much of its force. And disabled
plaintiffs' ability to invoke these existing commitments by states rests largely
upon states'need to obtain waivers from CMS before they can compel disabled
Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in managed care. Hence my basic thesis:
Access-related standards contained in CMS waivers permitting mandatory
managed care enrollment of disabled Medicaid recipients-if not metmay give meaning to Choate's "meaningful access" standard and thus enable
recipients to enforce those standards using § 504 or the ADA. The following
section will expand on and illustrate this point.
D. Calfornia's"Bridgeto Reform" Waiver
California's recent movement of nearly a quarter of a million seniors and
people with disabilities covered by Medi-Cal into managed care programs
illustrates how a state's waiver obligations might lay the foundation for a
disability discrimination action. As part of its "Bridge to Reform" demonstration
project waiver, 2 6 between June 2011 and May 2012, California moved 240,000
1
elderly and disabled Medi-Cal recipientsm
2 (whom the State refers to as
"Seniors and People with Disabilities" or SPD) out of fee-for-service settings
and into managed care plans.12s
126 The "Bridge to Reform,"which is the most recent addition to an ongoing demonstration
project in California under authority of a § i5 waiver, seeks to assist the State's move towards
implementation of the reforms associated with the Affordable Care Act. See State of California,
California Section In5 Comprehensive Demonstration Project Waiver, A Bridge to Reform: A
Section mi15
Waiver Proposal (June 2010) [hereinafter Bridge to Reform Application], available at
http://www.cdcan.us/medi--cal/SectionisWaiver/20ioo6io-A%2oBridge%2oto%2oReform%2o
6-io-2oo.pdf. Along with the mandatory movement of elderly and disabled persons into Medicaid managed care, the waiver also permits the state to extend coverage to more low-income adults
and to support reforms of public and academic hospital delivery systems. See SAMANTHA ARTIGA
SCHNEIDER, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., CALIFORNIAS "BRIDGE TO REFORM" MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION WAIVER
1, 5 (2011), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2O13/oi/8i 9 7-r.pdf. CMS
approved the request in November 201o. Letter from Donald M. Berwick, M.D., Adm'r, Ctrs. for

& ANDY

Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dept of Health & Human Ser's., to S. Kimberly Belshe, Sec'y,
Cal. Health & Human Servs. (Nov. 2, 2010), availableat http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/provgovpart/
Documents/Waiver%2oRenewal/CA%2oWaiver%2oApproval%2oLetter.pdf.
127 The initial stage of the Bridge to Reform targeted seniors and people with disabilities
who were covered only by Medi-Cal. The next stage would include the transition of dually eligible
persons into managed care. See Bridge to Reform Application, supra note z26, at 2, 4.
128 This is the initiative that prompted the "Huge ExperimentAims to Save on CareforPoorest,
Sickest Patients"headline. See Carey & Varney,supra note 2, at 1-2. An estimated 540,ooo additional
SPDs had previously enrolled in managed care plans voluntarily. Under the waiver, they could no
longer switch back into the fee-for-service system. See PETER HARBAGE & MEREDITH LEDFORD
KING, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND.,A BRIDGE To REFORM: CALIFORNIAS MEDICAID SECTION 1115
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Before it could require these Medi-Cal recipients to enroll in managed
care plans-a move that in many cases disrupted existing provider-patient
relationships129-California had to obtain a waiver from CMS. The State's
request for approval acknowledged that using managed care plans to meet
the complex medical and support needs of the SPD population would present
challenges, and it set out a series of "Key Performance Standards for Plans
Enrolling SPD Populations."These describe access-related standards addressing
network adequacy, enrollee access to information, and physical accessibility, as
well as standards addressing care management and coordination along with
performance monitoring and improvement.'
CMS approved California's Bridge to Reform demonstration project, but
conditioned its approval on the State's accepting an extensive list of "Special
Terms and Conditions," including ten pages specifically detailing requirements
for managed care delivery systems for SPD.'3 ' These Special Terms and
Conditions require continuing consultation with the State and CMS to ensure
that managed care plans contracted to serve mandatorily enrolled SPDs exhibit
"plan readiness."' 32 The following are examples of access-related items needed
for plan readiness: a specialty provider pool sufficient to meet the unique needs
of plan enrollees; a network that, considering the means of transportation that
SPDs ordinarily use, is geographically accessible; the completion of facility
site reviews to ensure physical accessibility; and the availability of interpreter
services.' The precise details of the application and the Special Terms and
Conditions matter little for this Article's central contention. What does matter
is that California committed itself to extensive steps to ensure that disabled
Medi-Cal recipients, enrolled in managed care, could actually access services
covered by Medi-Cal.1'34
available at http://www.chcf.org/-/media/MEDIA%2oLIBRARY%2oFiles/
PDF/B/PDF%2oBridgeToReformii 5Waiver.pdf
129 For anecdotal accounts of enrollees' concerns about the impact of this disruption on their
care, see Carey & Varney, supra note 2, at 1, 4,5130 See Bridge to Reform Application, supra note 126, at 447.
131 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., No. II-W-oOI 93/ 9 , CALIFORNIA BRIDGE
TO REFORM DEMONSTRATION: SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS 32-42 (2013) [hereinafter SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS], available at http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/provgovpart/Documents/
LIHP/Publications/CaliforniaSTCsI-2-rO.pdf. California's request for approval of the Bridge to
Reform Demonstration Project was seventy-one pages long. The Special Terms and Conditions
that CMS developed for the demonstration project ran to u16 pages.
WAIVER 22 (2012),

132 Id. at 37133 Id at 37-39-

134 Prior to submitting its waiver request, the California Department of Health Care Services
convened a workgroup including consumer advocates to address concerns about expanding mandatory managed care for elderly and disabled Medi-Cal recipients. For a description of the process
and resulting performance standards for managed care plans contracted to serve those Medi-Cal
recipients, see KATHY MOSES, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., RAISING THE BAR: How MEDI-CAL
STRENGTHENED MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 2 (2012), available
at http://www.chcf.org/-/media/MEDIA%2oLIBRARY%2oFiles/PDF/R/PDF%2oRaisingBar-
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Notwithstanding the extensive assurances that emerged from the process of
application and conditional approval, early assessments ofthe Bridge to Reform's
implementation found that some enrollees experienced troubling problems,
including difficulty in understanding communications about the transition and
managed care plans that were ill equipped to address complex conditions."'
This early review is not surprising, especially in light of California's aggressive
implementation timetable. Implementing and monitoring standards to ensure
access for disabled Medicaid recipients undoubtedly present greater challenges
than developing those standards. And, as a practical matter, any state may be
unable to entirely avoid having some individual disabled Medicaid recipients
experience serious ill effects from having to transition to managed care." 6
A disparate impact disability discrimination claim, however, does not focus
on the effect that any individual enrollee experiences. 13 7 Instead, this Article
proposes that one way for disability advocates to frame a disparate impact claim
is to ask whether the state (and its managed care contractors) have effectively
carried out the state's representations to CMS about how it will ensure that
disabled Medicaid recipients-as a group-have access to covered services. If
not, those recipients can claim that compelling them to enroll in managed care
deprived them of "meaningful access" to the benefit a state Medicaid program
provides (i.e., a set of covered services). In short, the plaintiffs can establish
what "meaningful access" requires by employing the state's own commitments
regarding the access-related safeguards it would undertake."'
ManagedCareContractsSPD.pdf.
135 See HARBAGE & KING, supra note 128, at 22, 27, KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,TRANSITIONING BENEFICIARIES WITH COMPLEX CARE NEEDS TO MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: INSIGHTS FROM CALIFORNIA 4-5 (2os3),avail-

able at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2ol3/o6/8453-transitioning-beneficiaries-with-complex-care-needs2.pdf
136 For anecdotal accounts of these difficulties, see Carey & Varney, supra note a. California's
waiver permits SPD beneficiaries who enroll in managed care to receive care from an existing provider for one year and to seek an exemption from enrollment for a year if they have specific medical
conditions, but consumer advocates assert that these policies were confusing and inconsistently
applied. See HARBAGE & KING, Supra note 128, at 24, 27.

137 For example, the successful disparate impact claim in American CounciloftheBlindv. Paulson,525 F 3d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2008), was based on the failure of the U.S. Treasury to design and issue
paper currency that is readily distinguishable to people with visual impairments. The complaint
alleged that "for millions of Americans with blindness or low vision, it is impossible to recognize
the denomination of banknotes."Id. at 1261.
138 This proposed reliance on the State's own standards, however, should not be understood as
the exclusive avenue for a successful disparate impact claim. In particular, times may exist when a
State's own standards, even if approved by CMS and fully implemented, would not sufficiently address the access issues that disabled Medicaid beneficiaries are likely to encounter when compelled
to enroll in managed care. As Professor Leslie Francis suggested to me, this concern regarding
inadequate state standards may become more immediate if CMS grows more lenient in granting
waivers in order to encourage states to participate in the ACAs Medicaid expansion. Cf Laura D.
Hermer,FederalStateTensions in FulfllingMedicaid'sPurposes, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 615, 636-37

(2012) (cautioning that CMS should not grant waivers that are inconsistent with Medicaid's pur-
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Framing the claim to incorporate the state's own representations should
help plaintiffs avoid a characterization-fatal under Choate-that they are
simply complaining that the benefit the state has chosen to provide does not
fully meet their more complex medical needs. Instead, plaintiffs can argue
that a state's failure to live up to its own access-related commitments keeps
disabled plaintiffs from enjoying the same chance as other Medicaid recipients
to benefit from enrollment in a Medicaid managed care plan. Another way of
stating this argument is that, by agreeing to access-related terms of a waiver,
the State accepts those adaptations of its Medicaid managed care program as
"reasonable"; the flip side of this analytic coin is that these steps do not reflect
fundamental alterations to the State's program.
California's "Bridge to Reform" offers just one example of a state seeking
CMS approval to require the enrollment of large numbers of disabled Medicaid
beneficiaries in managed care plans; a number of other big states are on the same
path.139 CMS has signaled that it expects states making waiver applications
to propose specific provisions about protections for people with disabilities."
And when a state represents to CMS the steps it will take to make sure
disabled Medicaid recipients have access to the services Medicaid covers, the
state's failure to take those steps can be framed as the state's failure to provide
meaningful access. Using this approach to give meaning to "meaningful access"
in the context of Medicaid managed care offers several benefits to advocates for
disabled Medicaid beneficiaries, but does not assure success, as the next Part
briefly outlines.

IV.

COULD

THIs APPROACH WORK?

A. The Benefits ofEmphasizing Waiver Commitments
in a "MeaningfulAccess"Claim

As discussed above, Choate's rejection of any assertion that the benefit
Medicaid provides is "adequate health care" presents an obstacle to pursuing
a claim that mandatory enrollment in Medicaid managed care has an adverse
disparate impact on people with disabilities. In short, states facing such a claim
can argue that as long as disabled Medicaid beneficiaries are able to enroll in a
managed care plan they have accessed the benefit that Medicaid provides. This
argument builds on a reading of Choate that emphasizes the point that disabled
Medicaid beneficiaries, like other Medicaid beneficiaries, received and benefited
pose of ensuring access to care).
139 See PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE,SUpra note 8, at 14 (not-

ing Texas's enrollment of disabled recipients into managed care); Iglehart, supra note 25, at 1627
(noting Florida's and New York's plans to shift all Medicaid beneficiaries into managed care).
140 See Iglehart,supra note 25, at r629 (noting that, in granting California's waiver, "[former]
CMS administrator Donald Berwick underscored the safeguards with which plans must abide and
the state must enforce").
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from the fourteen days of inpatient hospital coverage provided by Tennessee.141
For several reasons, however, a contemporary challenge to mandatory managed
care enrollment-if it focuses on the access-related commitments 42 made by
a state in a waiver application to CMS-would seem to have better prospects
of success.
First and foremost, because states must obtain a waiver before they can
mandate the enrollment of many disabled Medicaid beneficiaries in managed
care, a process is already in place by which states themselves describe the steps
they will take to ensure that disabled beneficiaries realistically have access to the
services that managed care plans have contracted to cover. 'The policy literature
has thoroughly analyzed the distinctive access issues that Medicaid managed
care presents for people with disabilities, as well as steps to help ensure access,' 43
and it stands to reason that states and CMS will take this into account in
making and conditionally granting waiver applications. CMS leadership has
already emphasized that states need to address the access needs of people with
disabilities in their waivers.'" As states seeking waivers make commitments
to CMS about what they will do to ensure access, the states themselves are
providing specific content to what "meaningful access" to Medicaid managed
care consists of. These prescriptions for "meaningful access" are far removed
from the nebulous concept of "adequate health care" that Choate deemed an
inadequate basis for a claim.
Moreover, it is not simply the specificity of access-related representations
in waivers that will help distinguish a contemporary challenge from Choate.
It is also the "ownership" that state Medicaid officials take of the protections
through the process of negotiating a waiver's approval by CMS. In Choate,
Justice Marshall expressed a concern about interpreting § 504 in a fashion that
intrudes on resource allocation decisions that the Medicaid statute entrusted to
the states.145 As he wrote: "[T]o require that the sort of broad-based distributive
decision at issue in this case always be made in the way most favorable, or
least disadvantageous, to the handicapped . . . would be to impose a virtually

141 See Francis & Silvers, supra note ro3, at 448-49,453. Francis and Silvers have argued that it
is more accurate to read Choate as a fact-specific holding in response to the plaintiffs'failure to provide strong evidence of an actual disparate impact and, thus, to show a lack of meaningful access. Id.
142 Some of the representations that a state makes will likely relate more to the quality of
care that is provided and its coordination than to access to providers, services, or physical facilities.
While the quality and coordination of care are also important to disabled Medicaid beneficiaries,
failures in these areas would be more difficult to characterize as failures of meaningful access.
143 See, e.g., PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND MEDICAID MANAGED CARE, Supra note 8, at
i-iii; see also LIPSON ET AL., supra note 44, at 1, 6, 8 (noting four guiding principles that States
should consider); NCD ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 44, at I, 6-o (making
recommendations regarding possible implementation plans); NCD POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION
CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 44, at 59-130 (setting forth 22 principles to "guide the design and

implementation of managed care for people with disabilities").
144 See HARBAGE & KING, supra note 128, at 2.
145 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,308 (1985).
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unworkable requirement on state Medicaid administrators."146 Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Olmstead v. Zimringl47 sounded a similar theme. Although that
case did not directly concern Medicaid, Olmsteads finding, that unnecessary
institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities in state facilities violated
the ADA, implicated the broader concern about federal courts directing state
program administrators. 148
A disparate impact challenge based on harms to disabled Medicaid
beneficiaries from their mandatory enrollment in managed care could easily
provoke a similar reaction. However, framing the challenge in terms of the
state's failure to satisfy its own waiver commitments could blunt this federalism
defense. Because the plaintiffs' yardstick for what the state must do to make
access meaningful would be based on the state's own commitments, the federal
courts would not be making decisions with resource implications for the state.
Instead, the court would simply be considering whether the state had lived up
to the commitments that its own officials made.
Finally, if the suggested reliance on the state's own waiver commitments
succeeds in overcoming any Choate-based defenses, disability discrimination
claims alleging the failure of managed care to provide "meaningful access"
to Medicaid-covered benefits could supply an important avenue of recourse
against a state Medicaid program. Since 2002, when the Supreme Court limited
private plaintiffs' ability to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce funding conditions
in federal statutes,'149 lower courts have stripped Medicaid beneficiaries of their
ability to sue state agencies for failing to comply with the requirements of the
federal Medicaid statute.so Although courts have found that some provisions
in the Medicaid statute evince Congress'intent to create enforceable rights in
Medicaid beneficiaries,'' since 2002 most federal courts of appeal have denied
private enforcement of a provision designed to ensure beneficiaries' access
to providers.152 Moreover, courts might find that the increasing latitude that
Congress has granted states to move Medicaid beneficiaries into managed care
is incompatible with Congressional intent to create private rights against the
state on the part of the Medicaid beneficiaries dissatisfied with their managed
146 Id.

147 Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 6o8, 61o-ii (i99) (Kennedy,J., concurring).
148 Id. at 61o (noting "the federalism costs inherent in referring state decisions regarding the
administration of treatment programs and the allocation of resources to the reviewing authority of
the federal courts").
149 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002).

iso Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court'sAssault on Litigation:Why (and How) It Might
Be Goodfor Health Law, 9o B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2332-34 (2010); see Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love
Triangle: 7he Spending Clause, Section 983, and Medicaid Entitlements,42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 413,
425-26, 442-43 (2oo8).

151 Moncrieff, supra note 150, at 2334

n.44.

152 Id. at 2333 & nn.36-37. The so-called "Equal Access Provision" requires States to reimburse
providers at a level high enough to ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries have access to providers that
is equal to that of other patients in their region. Id.
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care experience.'s Most recently, the Supreme Court avoided deciding whether
Medicaid beneficiaries can bring suit under the Supremacy Clause to challenge
a state law alleged to conflict with the Medicaid statute. 15 4 For these reasons,
the ability of Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce the Medicaid statute is highly
doubtful. But disabled plaintiffs' standing to sue to enforce the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA is well established.
B. Reasons To Be Less Sanguine

The foregoing discussion suggests that, notwithstanding Choate, advocates
may be able to pursue a disability discrimination claim if disabled Medicaid
beneficiaries are compelled to enroll in managed care plans that fail to provide
access to needed facilities and providers. But even if a court accepts that disabled
plaintiffs can pursue this avenue for relief, this approach does not assure success
in addressing the challenges that disabled Medicaid beneficiaries may face as
they transition into managed care settings. For several reasons, both legal and
practical, the relief a claim based on this theory realistically provides may be
limited.
Although focusing on the access-related commitments in state waiver
applications distinguishes a challenge by people with disabilities compelled to
enroll in Medicaid managed care from the challenge advanced in Choate,a state
may still argue that the access protections it agreed to in order to obtain a waiver
from CMS go above and beyond what Choate's "meaningful access" standard
requires. In other words, the state might argue that its waiver commitments
would provide some ideal level of access and that, therefore, its failure to live
up to those commitments does not necessarily equate to a failure to provide
"meaningful access." Although a state advancing this defense risks appearing
disingenuous, predicting a court's response is difficult.
Even if a court accepts the proposition that a state's waiver commitments
supply the standards for judging what "meaningful access" requires, the
plaintiffs'case may depend on those commitments being sufficiently articulated
to provide definite standards.1 5 5 For example, California's request for approval

153 See Devi M. Rao, Note, "MakingMedicalAssistanceAvailable:Enforcing the MedicaidAct's
Availability Provision Through § 1983 Litigation,ro9 COLUM. L. REV. 1440, 1441-43 (009).
154 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2012). See generally
Katherine Moran Meeks, Case Note, PrivateEnforcement ofSpending ConditionsAfter Douglas, 161
U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 56, 57 (202), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/16i-U-Pa-LRev-PENNumbra- 5 6.pdf (indicating that some scholars believe the Supremacy Clause may be
relevant in considering these claims).
155 Cf NCD ANALYSIS AND REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 44, at 7 (recommending that
readiness assessment conducted by CMS prior to approving a waiver should include "performance
benchmarks to be used in measuring access to services").
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of its "Bridge to Reform" demonstration contained the following language
regarding network adequacy:
Network adequacy for the enrollment of SPDs will require sufficient
specialists necessary to care for the specialized needs of this population
consistent with the Department of Managed HealthCare and DHCS
processes and any enhancements DHCS deems necessary to further support
the case of the SPDs. 56

While it sounds reassuring, this language does not provide specific benchmarks
that would permit a court to determine whether network adequacy had been
achieved. By contrast, the Special Terms and Conditions required by CMS as
a condition of approving California's waiver provide some greater specificity in
their reference to applicable federal and state regulations and data sources for
assessing adequacy,"s' but even they cannot anticipate a definite number of each
type of provider. While the absence of a definite "meaningful access" standard is
not necessarily fatal, a court asked to decide whether a plan's specialist network
in fact provides meaningful access may have qualms about intruding on the
territory of state program administrators.
Moreover, even if a state's waiver commitments easily translate into
measurable benchmarks for "meaningful access," determining whether a state
is failing to live up to its commitments in a way that is actionable may be
difficult. A disparate impact cause of action alleging a state's failure to provide
"meaningful access" essentially asserts that compelling disabled Medicaid
recipients to enroll in managed care plans has an adverse impact on them as
a group that exceeds the harms experienced by other Medicaid managed care
enrollees. Showing that an individual disabled Medicaid beneficiary, after the
transition to managed care, is no longer able to see a needed specialist will not,
by itself, support a claim against the state for failure to provide meaningful
access."ss Instead, plaintiffs must show group disadvantage flowing from their
required enrollment in managed care. Developing that proof depends on
systemic monitoring of the implementation of managed care for people with
disabilities and reporting its results. While a state's waiver application is likely
to include commitments to engage in monitoring and reporting, commentators
express concerns about how vigorously resource-strapped state Medicaid

156 See Bridge to Reform Application, supra note 126, at 45.
157 See SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra note 131, at 44-45, 56.

158 Some overlap, however, may exist in situations involving physical accessibility that would
support a disability discrimination claim by an individual disabled plaintiff and a disparate impact
claim by a group of disabled plaintiffs. For example, the failure of a doctor's practice to remove
physical barriers to its facilities or to provide equipment that is accessible may be the basis for an
individual ADA Title III claim against the practice. If the doctors' practices making up the physician network for a managed care plan that has contracted with a state to provide Medicaid coverage consistently fail to remove barriers or provide accessible equipment, then disabled Medicaid
recipients may argue that this systemic lack of access demonstrates the disparate impact they suffer
from compulsory managed care enrollment.
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agencies will be able to monitor implementation.15 And without systemic
monitoring and reporting, plaintiffs trying to prove a disparate impact may
have little more than anecdotes as evidence.
Finally, this Article's suggested approach to pursuing a disability
discrimination claim applies only when a state seeks CMS approval to move
disabled Medicaid beneficiaries into managed care.160 If a state can compel
disabled Medicaid recipients to enroll in managed care plans without going
through the waiver process, as it can for adults with disabilities who are not dual
eligibles, then the state may have no need to make access-related commitments.
Without these commitments, Choate's reasoning may remain a substantial
barrier to any suit. 6 1 Because Congress has gradually made it easier for states
to mandate managed care enrollment for Medicaid recipients, some disabled
Medicaid beneficiaries have already been moved into managed care without the
need for a waiver.162 Currently, however, states must still obtain a waiver before
mandating the enrollment of children with special needs and persons who
are dual eligibles, categories that represent a substantial fraction of disabled
Medicaid beneficiaries.16 1 If Medicaid were transformed into a block grant
program, as some have proposed,'" then CMS would likely no longer play
any gatekeeper role with respect to states' ability to transform their Medicaid
programs.
C. Still an Idea Worth Pursuing?
Despite these potential limitations on the robustness of a theory of disability
discrimination liability that depends on states' waiver commitments to ensure
access for disabled Medicaid beneficiaries compelled to enroll in managed
care, disability advocates should prepare to pursue this theory as the Medicaid
managed care "juggernaut" advances. 6 s Part of the challenge of this theory, but
also one of its strengths, is that it reinforces just how crucial involvement of
and advocacy by disability rights groups are throughout the transition process.
Advocacy groups have already been heavily involved, and continued involvement
will be critical: suggesting standards to be used in waiver applications, engaging
with CMS officials as they review applications, monitoring the implementation

159 NCD ANALYSIS AND REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 44, at 2; Neuman et al., supra note
35, at n191.
160 MosEs, supra note 134, at 2, 3, 6. (Furthermore, this article's suggested approach only ap-

plies when the state's standards are sufficiently high to address the access challenges that people
with disabilities are likely to face when required to enroll in Medicaid managed care.).
161 See supra Part III.C.
162 See Iglehart,supra note 25, at 1628.
163 See MEDICAID AND MANAGED CARE 2010, supra note 7, at I.
164 See Robert Pear, G. O.P Blueprint Would Remake Health Policy,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 201, at
Ai (describing Ryan budget plan proposals).
165 Iglehart, supra note 25, at 1629.
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of Medicaid managed care for people with disabilities, and disseminating the
results.
The value of monitoring and reporting, however, extends well beyond the
possibility of establishing the basis for a disability discrimination claim. It will
not be until the enrollment of people with disabilities in Medicaid managed
care becomes more widespread and uniform that researchers and policymakers
will be able to assess what works-and what does not-in the effort to fidfill,
to the utmost extent, the promise of Medicaid managed care for people with
disabilities while avoiding as much as possible its perils.'" As this process
unfolds, monitoring the effects of compelled enrollment on this population may
help fill the existing knowledge void about how to manage and coordinate the
care of people with disabilities to best promote their health while controlling
costs.
CONCLUSION

Inevitably, the process of figuring out what works and what does not in
providing Medicaid managed care to persons with disabilities will have an
element of trial and error. As this occurs, however, disability discrimination law
may provide an important backstop to ensure that state agencies do not ignore
problems that may arise, but instead engage in close oversight and remedial
action as they attempt to figure out what works. To be sure, to the extent that
all Medicaid recipients have reason to worry about their health care because
of state budgetary woes and limitations imposed by managed care, disability
discrimination law does not provide any special protection for people with
disabilities. It does not give them any right to suffer less from these challenges
than do their fellow non-disabled Medicaid recipients.
If, however, a state rushes to enroll its disabled Medicaid recipients into
managed care in a way that quite predictably leaves them without access to the
care that Medicaid promises to cover,'6 1 then disability discrimination law may
play an important role in countering the state's disregard for its failure to ensure
access. Disabled Medicaid beneficiaries should be able to frame a disparate
impact claim by relying on the state's own commitments in its Medicaid waiver
applications in order to give meaning to the "meaningful access" that § 504 and
the ADA require.

166 See Iglehart,supra note 25, at 1628 (quoting Diane Rowland, chair of Medicaid and CHIP
Payment and Access Commission, noting importance of assessing the impact of managed care
enrollment on "sicker and more frail populations").
167 Cf Neuman et al., supra note 35, at uS6, n9o (cautioning, with respect to the enrollment
of dual eligibles in managed care, that time is needed for developing infrastructure and resources).

